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 
Abstract--Emerging cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are 
becoming urgent engineering issues for modern substations. This 
paper proposes a novel intrusion detection system (IDS) tailored 
for cybersecurity of IEC 61850 based substations. The proposed 
IDS integrates physical knowledge, protocol specifications and 
logical behaviors to provide a comprehensive and effective 
solution that is able to mitigate various cyberattacks. The 
proposed approach comprises access control detection, protocol 
whitelisting, model-based detection, and multi-parameter based 
detection. This SCADA-specific IDS is implemented and validated 
using a comprehensive and realistic cyber-physical test-bed and 
data from a real 500kV smart substation. 
Index Terms-- Smart substation, SCADA, cybersecurity, IEC 
61850, intrusion detection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EC 61850 [1] based supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems play a significant and increasingly critical 
role in smart grid operation, becoming more complex and 
interconnected as state-of-the-art information and 
communication technologies (ICT) are adopted. The increased 
complexity and interconnection of SCADA systems have 
exposed them to a wide range of cybersecurity threats, which 
may lead to serious physical damage [2]. 
In recent years, malicious cybersecurity incidents have 
occurred in industrial control systems around the world. For 
instance, in July 2010 the Stuxnet worm that attacked Iranian 
nuclear facilities is the most famous malware attack to damage 
an industrial infrastructure directly [3]; in December 2015, a 
coordinated intentional cyberattack via the BlackEnergy 
malware was directly responsible for power outages for at least 
80,000 customers in western Ukraine. The incident is the first 
known power outage caused by a cyberattack [4]. Stuxnet and 
BlackEnergy have demonstrated that “security by obscurity” is 
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no longer an adequate scheme for critical infrastructures. 
Many governments and government agencies have expressed 
concern at the possibility of catastrophic damage to their 
critical infrastructures from Stuxnet-like or BlackEnergy-like 
attacks in the future. 
As these threats have emerged, electrical utilities have 
found that existing IT-specific security methodologies are not 
fully compatible with IEC 61850 based SCADA operation 
scenarios. For example, traditional IT security appliances such 
as firewalls and intrusion detection system (IDS) are generally 
unable to interpret the application layer data for such 
communications, either for a single packet, or at a session 
layer, where the state of a connection should be monitored for 
inconsistencies. In addition, to a provide an accurate analysis 
of the network communications, the analyzing system needs to 
have some knowledge of the underlying physical infrastructure 
in order to process decisions about whether observed patterns 
of communication are benign or malicious. While generic IT 
communications are heterogeneous and widely varied in 
nature, a cyber-physical system has a certain structure and 
communication patterns that should be used to support 
detection of suspicious activities. Furthermore, although the 
IEC 62351 [5] standard defines a framework for the provision 
of cybersecurity for the IEC 61850 protocol, major 
manufacturers do not generally implement adequate security in 
their intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) [6]. With vendors 
slow to respond, it has become essential that utilities are able 
to fill this security gap to enable them to detect and mitigate 
again emerging threats. However, contemporary intrusion 
detection approaches are generally inadequate for application 
to this domain. Consequently, the contribution of the presented 
research is a network intrusion detection system tailored to 
respond to cyberattacks that intend to exploit and disrupt 
systems reliant on IEC 61850, which is likely to be the 
dominant protocol in emerging smart grid systems. 
Furthermore, this research has been informed by, developed 
for, and validated within the context of a real substation 
environment.  
Much research has been proposed in intrusion and anomaly 
detection targeted for SCADA systems [7]-[18]. However, 
research on cost-effective IDS for IEC 61850 smart 
substations is still in an early stage of development [19]-[22]. 
Cheung et al. [8] believed that model-based monitoring to 
detect unknown attacks is more feasible in SCADA systems 
than in general IT networks, using protocol-level modes, 
communication-pattern-based detection and a learning-based 
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approach. Unfortunately, no quantitative results were obtained 
from this work nor detailed analysis regarding experimental 
validation. Carcano et al. [9] proposed critical state-based IDS 
for SCADA based on the Modbus protocol in a power plant. 
However, this system can only detect a limited class of attacks 
against programmable logic controller (PLC) systems. Fovino 
et al. [10] also utilized critical states in IDS supporting 
Modbus and DNP3. Barbosa et al. [11] adopted a network 
flow whitelisting based intrusion detection approach for the 
security of SCADA systems. The flow whitelist in the 
proposed approach is learned by capturing network traffic at 
two water treatment plants and at an electric-gas utility. 
However, this detection approach did not consider protocol 
specifications and features such as IEC 61850. Premaratne et 
al. [12] used a rule-based IDS for an IED based on IEC 61850 
in Snort parlance. The Snort rules are obtained from 
experimental data based upon simulated cyberattacks without 
considering the protocol’s specification. The proposed 
blacklist approach is shown to detect known attacks 
effectively. However, blacklists are typically not effective 
against unknown threats or undiscovered vulnerabilities, also 
called zero-day attacks. Kwon et al. [14] proposed a behavior-
based IDS to detect anomalous events by statistical analysis of 
IEC 61850 based substation network traffic, limited to 
manufacturing message specification (MMS) and generic 
object oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages. However, 
most statistical intrusion methods generate false negatives 
which miss real attacks. Hong et al. [15] presented a host- and 
network-based anomaly detection system to detect simulated 
attacks in substations. However, this anomaly detection is 
limited to the multicast protocols, i.e., GOOSE and sampled 
measure value (SMV).  Yoo et al. [18] proposed an anomaly-
detection system for the IEC 61850 protocols (MMS and 
GOOSE) including pre-processing, normal-behavior learning 
and anomaly detection. However, its detection accuracy still 
needs to be improved in order to apply it in the real substation. 
Much more in-depth insight into integrating physical 
knowledge, protocol specifications and logical behaviors with 
SCADA-specific IDPS is urgently required for cybersecurity 
of IEC 61850 based control systems.  
In response to the challenge represented by cyber 
vulnerabilities in IEC 61850 smart substations [23], this paper 
proposes a novel IDS. The comprehensive SCADA-specific 
IDS is tailored for cybersecurity of IEC 61850 based SCADA 
networks. It consists of access control detection, protocol 
whitelisting detection, model-based detection, and multi-
parameter based detection. This final component, based on 
multiple parameters, utilizes inspection of communications at 
the application layer in order provide exceptionally fine 
grained monitoring of system commands for anomalies. This 
SCADA-specific IDS is implemented and validated using a 
realistic cyber-physical test-bed of a 500kV smart substation. 
Section II presents the technical background. Section III 
proposes a novel intrusion detection system for IEC 61850 
based SCADA networks. Section IV discusses the 
implementation approach of the proposed SCADA-IDS. In 
Section V, a SCADA-specific cybersecurity test-bed is 
presented to investigate potential intrusions, exemplify and 
validate the proposed SCADA-IDS.  
II. BACKGROUND 
This section contains the brief introduction of IEC 61850 
and substation configuration description language from the 
viewpoint of supporting the proposed IDS for IEC 61850 
based SCADA networks.  
A. IEC 61850 
The abstract data models defined in IEC 61850 can be 
mapped to many protocols. Current mappings in this standard 
are mainly to MMS, GOOSE, and SMV [24], [25]. The MMS 
protocol is applied in the station level based on the 
client/server model, which runs over TCP/IP networks. The 
GOOSE and the SMV protocols are both based on 
publish/subscription mechanism in the substation local area 
network (LAN) using high speed switched Ethernet [31]. The 
IEC 61850 protocol stack is shown in Fig. 1.  
In terms of the transport layer of the MMS protocol stack in 
Fig. 1, international standards organization (ISO) transport 
(ISO/IEC 8073) means connection oriented transport protocol 
(COTP), and RFC 1006 stands for ISO transport services on 
top of the TCP (TPKT) (the TCP port for TPKT traffic is 
102). In Fig. 1, ACSI, abstract communication service 
interface, defines the virtual interface to an IED providing 
abstract communication services [1]. 
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Fig. 1.  IEC 61850 protocol stack 
 
The GOOSE/SMV datagrams comply with ISO/IEC 8802-3 
in the data link layer. The ISO/IEC 8802-3 frame format for 
GOOSE/SMV packets is illustrated in Fig. 2. The destination 
address has six octets corresponding to an Ethernet MAC 
multicast address. The source address is a unicast MAC 
address. According to IEEE 802.1Q, the priority/VLAN tag is 








































Header MAC Length = m + 8 (m<1492)
APPID  =  application identifier
APDU  =  application protocol data unit
TPID    =  tag protocol identifier
VLAN  =  virtual local area network
CFI     =  canonical format indicator
MAC  =  medium access cOntrol
TCI    =   tag control information
 
Fig. 2.  ISO/IEC 8802-3 frame format for GOOSE/SMV datagrams 
 
critical traffic for protection relevant applications from low 
priority traffic. Abstract syntax notation one (ASN.1) in 
relation with basic encoding rules (BER) is used for encoding 
and decoding of the GOOSE/SMV messages for transmission 
on ISO/IEC 8802-3, which has the format of a triplet TLV 
(Tag, Length, Value) [24], [25]. The destination address, user 
priority, VLAN ID, application identifier (APPID) and several 
fields of application protocol data unit (APDU) are 
configured in a substation configuration description (SCD) file 
for a practical smart substation.  
B. Substation Configuration Description Language (SCL) 
SCL files are used to exchange the configuration data, such 
as IED capability description (ICD) and SCD [26] [27]. The 
SCL is able to describe a substation configuration and all IEDs 
configurations in the substation using object models. It also 
specifies a unified and standardized format for configuring the 
substation and related IEDs. Therefore, the security, reliability 
and interoperation of smart substations are based on SCL 
configuration files. SCL, based on XML 1.0, defines specific 
syntax structures using XML Schema. A typical SCL file 
contains five elements, such as Header, Substation, 
Communication, IED, and DataTypeTemplates. An SCL file is 
a typical tree structure, as shown in Fig. 3. An SCL element is 
a node of the tree, and nested elements are child nodes of the 
tree. In Fig. 3, LN, DOType, DAType represent the logic node, 


















Fig. 3.  Structure of SCL configuration file 
III. PROPOSED IDS FOR IEC 61850 BASED SCADA 
Based on recent related cyberattacks such as Havex, Stuxnet 
and Ukraine, the motivation for the proposed network IDS is 
to detect SCADA-specific behaviors carried out by an intruder 
who has already gained a foothold in the network due to an 
infected human machine interface (HMI), engineering laptop, 
or a similar initial vector. These initial infections typically 
exploit IT software vulnerabilities unrelated to the core control 
system. However at this point the intruder is likely to attempt 
reconnaissance activity on the SCADA network, to scan the 
network, enumerate hosts and devices, and gather intelligence 
about devices of interest, for example IEDs, etc. Unless they 
have well established intelligence from some other source they 
may well attempt some fuzzing activity on the network to 
establish responses from devices of interest. Assuming that 
cybersecurity preventative measures have failed and allowed 
this intrusion, it is now vital that a further layer of detection 
can react to the abovementioned intrusion activities in the 
highly sensitive SCADA network. 
A SCADA-IDS for IEC 61850 smart substations is 
therefore proposed as an effective tool to identify both external 
malicious attacks and internal unintended misuse. This novel 
mechanism blends physical knowledge and behavioral logic of 
power systems with emerging IT security approaches. The 
proposed IDS approach consists of four dimensions: 1) access-
control detection; 2) protocol whitelisting detection; 3) model-
based detection; 4) multi-parameter based detection.  
The theoretical basis supporting this scheme is grounded in 
the well-established cyber security principle of defense in 
depth [30]. This theory first recommends establishing a 
network perimeter policed by standard security controls such 
as firewalls. For the scenario investigated in this paper a 
logical network perimeter can be formed around the digital 
substation, which contains a secure zone of IEC 61850 related 
communications. The next stage to ensure defense in depth is 
to establish monitoring mechanisms within the secure zone that 
can detect breaches and failures of security controls, e.g. an 
attacker penetrating a misconfigured firewall, or bypassing the 
firewall completely by launching an attack from a malware-
infected laptop that has been directly connected to the 
substation LAN by an engineer. Once an intruder has 
established a presence in the target substation network, 
automated or manual activities will be initiated, ranging from 
basic network scans, to “fuzzing” and deliberately crafting 
packets to attempt to gain a response from an IED, or to cause 
a specific command to be executed. Each of these actions will 
not be prevented by perimeter firewalls, because they occur 
inside the perimeter of the secure zone. Therefore the 
proposed IDS IEC 61850 has been designed to detect the 
multiple layers of activity and complexity of communications 
that may be generated by a successful intruder. Four methods 
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to support this multidimensional defense in depth IDS 
approach have been implemented, and will now be explained. 
A. Access-Control Detection (ACD) 
The ACD is a kind of access-control whitelist strategy 
including medium-access control (MAC) addresses in the 
Ethernet layer, IP addresses in the network layer and ports in 
the transport layer. The TCP port for IEC 61850 traffic is 
<102>. If any of the addresses or ports is not in the 
corresponding whitelist, the detector will take pre-configured 
action, e.g., alert in the IDS mode, block in IPS (intrusion 
prevention system) mode, and log the detection results. That is, 
   ( / , )wlAC AC Actions alert block log   (1) 
where AC = MACsrc, MACdst, IPsrc, IPdst, Portsrc, Portdst  and 
ACwl represents corresponding whitelist set. MACsrc, MACdst, 
IPsrc, IPdst, Portsrc, Portdst  mean source and destination MAC, 
source and destination IP, as well as source and destination 
ports, respectively. 
Each host or device in a SCADA system has a unique <IP, 
MAC> match. If the device has not been replaced with new 
hardware and the same IP address of the device is detected 
from two or more MAC addresses, it means that a spoofing 
attack may be happening. Malware attempting to communicate 
out to a command and control server can also generate 
unexpected address and network activities, particularly after 
the initial infection stage.  
B. Protocol Whitelisting Detection (PWD) 
The protocol whitelisting detection refers to layers 2-7 in 
terms of the open systems interconnection (OSI) model, and 
deals with various protocols of smart substation networks, 
such as MMS, COTP, TPKT, simple network time protocol 
(SNTP), GOOSE, SMV, and IEEE 1588. A typical substation 
based on IEC 61850 consists of a station bus and a process 
bus. In terms of the station bus, the detector can be set to allow 
communication traffic complying with MMS/COTP/TPKT/ 
SNTP. In terms of the process bus, the detector will only allow 
GOOSE/SV/IEEE 1588 traffic. In different scenarios, the 
detector can be set to support specific protocols. For example, 
when the IDS is deployed at the process bus of the smart 
substation, this detector only allows GOOSE/SV/IEEE 1588 
traffic, otherwise, it will generate an alert message for the 
suspicious traffic. 
C. Model-based Detection (MBD) 
The proposed model-based detection approach analyses 
SCD files and normal IEC 61850 traffic contents, defines 
normal and correct behavior models using in-depth protocol 
analysis, and compares profiles of benign behaviors against 
observed traffic to identify anomalous deviations. A model-
based anomalous behavior detection approach has the potential 
to detect as-yet unknown attacks. Compared with traditional IT 
networks, SCADA networks in smart substations have 
distinguishing characteristics such as regular traffic flows and 
predictable behavior patterns, which potentially simplifies the 
specification of behavior models. The proposed MBD has the 
potential to identify malicious attacks or unintended anomalies 
both in the station bus and the process bus. 
1) MBD for Station Bus 
In the station bus, the anomalous behavior detection is 
based on ACSI (mapping to MMS) or SNTP. The detection 
models are defined as follows, 
a) Report Service Model 
In the SCD file, the maximum number of instantiable report 
control blocks of each IED has been configured. The proposed 
report service model defines the maximum number of 
instantiable report control blocks for each IED as a detection 
rule. If the MBD identifies abnormal connection requests that 
could occupy all the instantiable report control blocks of the 
IED, it will alert a suspicious denial-of-service (DoS) attack 
and log the detection results. 
b) Association Service Model 
The proposed association service model defines the 
maximum number of IEC 61850 clients that can be connected. 
If the MBD detects abnormal connection requests to the 
clients, it will generate an alert and log the detection result. 
c) Setting Service Model 
The proposed setting service model defines that only an 
IEC 61850 client is allowed to modify a setting. If this model 
is violated, the MBD will generate actions (alert and log). 
d) File Transfer Model 
The ACSI GetFile service is used by a client to transfer the 
contents of a file from the server to the client. The ACSI 
GetFileAttributeValues service is used by a client to obtain the 
name and attributes of a specific file in the server's file store 
[24]. The proposed file transfer model defines an IEC 61850 
client can only transfer a single file. If this rule is violated, it 
will generate an alert and log the detection result. 
e) SNTP Model 
In the substation network, SNTP [28] is used to accomplish 
time synchronization via LAN communication. The SNTP 
traffic adopts the user datagram protocol (UDP) in the 
transport layer. In terms of the SNTP traffic, the port number 
of UDP connection to an IEC 61850 server should be <123>. 
If the port number of the SNTP traffic is not <123>, the MBD 
will trigger an alarm and save the result in the log file.  
f) Time-Related Model 
Critical control commands have time-related constraints 
such as time interval limit and frequency limit. If the same 
legitimate command is sent too frequently, it may violate the 
following rules. In each case the detector will initiate some 
actions (alert and log).  
      1 ,CV n CV n T Actions alert log     (2) 
where CV is a control command, n is a positive integer (n>1), 
and T is the limit of time interval. 
 












where F represents the frequency limit. 
2) MBD for Process Bus 
In the process bus, the model-based detection is based on 
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GOOSE and SMV protocol specifications. The GOOSE 
APDU has twelve fields such as gocbRef (control block 
reference), timeAllowedToLive, datSet (data set reference), 
goID (GOOSE ID), t (event timestamp), StNum (state number), 
SqNum (sequence number), test (test identifier), confRev 
(configuration revision), ndsCom (needs commissioning), 
numDatSetEntries (number of data set entries) and allData 
[24]. According to IEC 61850-9-2, the SMV datagram adopts 
ISO/IEC 8802-3 in the data link layer, similar to the GOOSE 
datagram. The SV APDU has five fields such as svID (SMV 
control block ID), smpCnt (sample counter), confRev 
(configuration revision), smpSynch (sample synchronization), 
and seqData (sequence of data). The part of proposed 
detection models are defined as follows,  
a) Destination Address Model 
The destination ISO/IEC 8802-3 multicast address is 
configured for the transmission of GOOSE/SMV in the SCD 
file (<Communication><SubNetwork><ConnectedAP>). 
The destination address fields (6 octets) of a GOOSE packet 
and a SMV packet start with four octets (01-0C-CD-01) and 
(01-0C-CD-04), respectively. The destination address models 
for GOOSE and SMV are shown in (4) and (5), i.e. 
( )
[01-0C-CD-01-00-00,01-0C-CD-01-01-FF]
GOOSEP P DstAdrField P  

   (4) 
where P is the captured packet in the process bus, PGOOSE 
represents GOOSE packets and DstAField represents the value 




SMVP P DstAField P  

   (5) 
where PSMV represents SMV packets. 
b) TPID Field Model 
The tag protocol identifier (TPID) field (2 octets) shows the 
Ethertype assigned for 802.1Q Ethernet encoded frames. The 
value of the TPID field in the GOOSE/SMV packet shall be 
0x8100, i.e. 
 / ( ) 0x8100GOOSE SMVP P TPIDField P        (6) 
where TPIDField means the value of the TPID field, and  
P GOOSE/SMV represents GOOSE or SMV packets. 
c) EtherType Field Model 
The EtherType field (2 octets) of ISO/IEC 8802-3 is 
registered by the IEEE authority. The assigned EtherType 
values for GOOSE and SMV are 0x88B8 and 0x88BA, 
respectively, i.e. 
( ) 0x81B8GOOSEP P EthTField P        (7) 
where EthTField is the value of the EtherType field. 
( ) 0x81BASMVP P EthTField P         (8) 
d) Priority Field Model 
The priority field (3 bits) model defines the priority values 
of GOOSE and SMV packets. The default value for 
GOOSE/SMV is 4, which is also configured in the SCD file. 
The priority value should be from 0 to 7, i.e.  
/ ( ) [0,7]GOOSE SMVP P PrioField P           (9) 
where PrioField is the value of the user priority field. 
e) APPID Field Model 
Each GOOSE/SMV control block has a unique APPID in 
the SCD file. The APPID field (2 octets) of a GOOSE packet 
should be 4-bit hexadecimal, i.e., [0000-3FFF], and that of an 
SMV packet should be [4000-7FFF]. This detection models 
are as follows,  
( ) [0000, 3FFF]GOOSEP P APPIDField P       
(10) 
( ) [4000, 7FFF]SMVP P APPIDField P         (11) 
f) Length Model 
The length field (2 octets) of a GOOSE/SMV packet 
specifies the total number of bytes in the frame starting from 
APPID to APDU, which is equal to 8+m (m is the length of 
APDU, m < 1492). The length field model is as follows, 
/ ( ) [8,1500]GOOSE SMVP P LengField P       (12) 
where LengField is the value of the length field. 
 The length of the goID field in the GOOSE APDU is less 
than 65 bytes, i.e. 
( ) 65GOOSEP P LenGoIDField P        (13) 
where LenGOIDField is the length of the goID field. 
g) TimeAllowedToLive Field Model 
The timeAllowedToLive field in the GOOSE APDU should 
be double MaxTime (2T0). The “MaxTime” is typically 
configured as <5000> in the SCD file 
(<Communication><SubNetwork><ConnectedAP><G
SE><MaxTime>). If there is no any GOOSE packet within 
10000ms, this detection model will send communication 
interrupt alarm. 
h) Tag Field Model 
In the GOOSE tag field model, the tag values of gocbRef, 
timeAllowedToLive, datSet, goID, t, StNum, SqNum, test, 
confRev, ndsCom and numDatSetEntries fields of a GOOSE 
packet are 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 
0x88, 0x89, and 0x8a, respectively. In the SMV tag field 
model, the tag values of svID, smpCnt, confRev and smpSynch 
fields of a SMV packet are 0x80, 0x82, 0x83 and 0x85, 
respectively. 
i) SmpCnt field Models  
The smpCnt field model specifies the values of a counter, 
which is incremented each time a new sample of the analogue 
value is taken. When the sample rate is 4000Hz (80 
samples/cycle) for merging units (MUs), the values of smpCnt 
should be kept in the right order within the scope of [0, 3999], 
i.e. 
( ) [0, 3999]SMVP P SmpCField P        (14) 
where SmpCField is the value of the smpCnt field. 
j) Correlation Models  
According to the practical SCD configuration of the smart 
substation, the APPID field equals to the last two octets of the 
destination address field. It can be defined as a correlation 
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field model, i.e. 
/ 5,6( ) {abcd}
[0000,01FF] ( ) {abcd}
GOOSE SMVP P DstAField P
APPIDField P




where DstAField(P)5,6 represents last two octets of the 
destination address field. 
The type of the gocbRef field in the GOOSE APDU is 
visible-string comprising logical device (LD) name, logical 
node (LN) name, functional constraint (FC) and control block 
(CB) name, i.e., LD/LN$FC$CB. The datSet field in the 
GOOSE APDU consists of LD name, LN name and data set 
(DS) name, i.e., LD/LN$DS. The default value of the goID 
field in the GOOSE APDU is similar to that of the gocbRef 
field, i.e., LD/LN$CB. The LD/LN value in the gocoRef field 
matches with that in the datSet field. The control block name 
in the gocoRef field matches with that in the goID field. For 
instance, gocbRef: PM5001APIGO/LLN0$GO$gocb1, datSet: 
PM5001APIGO/LLN0$dsGOOSE1, goID: PM5001APIGO 
/LLN0.gocb1. The corresponding correlation filed model is 
presented as follow, 
  
( ) {LD/LN$FC$CB}
( ) {LD/LN$DS} 
( ) {LD/LN$CB}
GOOSEP P APDU GocbField P
DatSField P
GoIDField P
    
 
 
      
(16) 
where GocbField, DatSField, and GoIDfield represent the 
gocbRef, datSet, and goID fields, respectively. 
The changes of state number (StNum) and the sequence 
number (SqNum) in the GOOSE APDU strictly comply with 
associated behavior patterns. The value of StNum shall 
increment when a value of datSet has changed in a sent 
GOOSE message, which shall cause the value of SqNum to be 
set to zero. When the value of StNum has no change, the value 
of SqNum will increment for each GOOSE transmission, but it 
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   
  
      
 (17) 
where StNum(GPi) and SqNum(GPi) mean the StNum and the 




k) Traffic based Model 
According to captured traffic from practical substation 
scenarios, the traffic based model defines the upper and lower 
threshold values of the packet transfer rate per second (PPS), 
transfer byte size per second (BPS), the length of packets 
(LoP), and size of packets (SoP) as the normal traffic 
behaviors. This traffic detection model is as follows,  
min max min max
min max min max
[ , ] [ , ]
[ , ] [ , ]
PPS PPS PPS BPS BPS BPS
LoP LoP LoP SoP SoP SoP
 
 
    (18) 
where PPSmin and PPSmax represent the lower and upper 
threshold values of the PPS. 
Any occurrences outside these proposed models are 
considered anomalous and suspicious. If any of the 
aforementioned models is violated, the MBD will generate an 
alert and log the detection result. 
D. Multi-Parameter based Detection (MPD) 
The core idea of the multi-parameter based detection is to 
identify possible threats against SCADA resulting from 
internal unintended misuse or external malicious attacks by 
monitoring the most operationally sensitive parameters of a 
smart substation. These multidimensional parameters are 
related to the secure and stable operation of the smart 
substation, such as remote measurement and remote signaling 
data from the station bus and the process bus in IEC 61850 
substations. Multi-parameter detection strategies, such as 
critical switching signal correlation and key analog signal 
comparison, are proposed here from physical knowledge and 
operational experience of smart substations. 
1) Remote Signaling Comparison Detector 
In the IEC 61850 smart substation, intelligent terminals in 
the process bus apply GOOSE messages to send remote 
signaling data to IEDs in the bay level, and receive trip/close 
instructions from relay devices or monitoring and control 
devices. The proposed remote signaling comparison detector 
identifies abnormal events by comparing the GOOSE 
messages and associated MMS messages. For example, if a 
switch-in signal of a relay IED (GOOSE message) in the 
process level and the associated signal report (MMS message) 
from the station level are inconsistent, an abnormal alarm will 
occur, as shown in Fig. 4. 
Switch-in signal action 
from process bus





Fig. 4.  An example of remote signaling comparison detector 
 
2) Remote Measurement Comparison Detector 
In IEC 61850 smart substations, merging units (MUs) have 
sample value models, and send SV messages to relay devices, 
monitoring and control devices. The remote measurement 
comparison detector contains two categories: 
a)  Range Detector 
Normally, sampled measure values belong to an operational 
range with upper and lower boundary values, such as current 
(I) and voltage (U). If the measured value is outside the 
expected range, some actions will execute automatically, i.e.,
          




SMV i SMV i e i SMV i e i
Actions alert log i I U
    
 
 (19) 
where SMV(i) (i = I,
 
U,
 …) represents different sample 
measure values, such as current and voltage; [SMV (i)min  e (i), 
and SMV (i)max+e (i)] stand for the range between the upper 
and lower boundary and e(i) measures the tolerance.  
In normal operation scenarios, the upper and lower 
boundaries are configured according to design and operation 
specifications of substations. For example, the upper and lower 
bus voltage boundaries for a 500(330) kV substation are set as 
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90% and 110% voltage rating, respectively. From the point of 
view of the SCADA security operation, as long as the 
measured value is outside the expected range, this suspicious 
phenomenon should be noticed and addressed by operators in 
substations. Therefore, this proposed range detector may 
identify the abnormal incidents result from measurement errors 
or malicious attacks. 
b)  Consistency Detector 
In practical scenarios, related double configured IEDs (A 
and B sets) in the bay level receive the same sampled values of 
MUs from associated current transformer / voltage transformer 
(CT/VT). The proposed consistency detector is used to detect 
inconsistency among configured SMV parameters of MUs and 
the associated MMS of multiple relay devices, such as the line 
relay A/B, bus relay A/B, and transformer relay A/B. 
Parameters for remote measurement comparison consist of the 
voltage, current and differential current. If the consistency 
detector is violated, an abnormal alarm will occur, as 
illustrated in Fig. 5. 
SV 
comparison
SV of MU A 
MMS of line relay A 
MMS of bus rely A
SV of MU B 
MMS of line relay B 
MMS of bus rely B





MMS of relay A








Fig. 5.  Consistency detector 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
The proposed SCADA-IDS was implemented based on a 
Linux system (Ubuntu 12.04). It was deployed between the 
station bus and the process bus to monitor and detect SCADA 
traffic in both networks of the IEC 61850 based substation. It 
consists of five modules such as IDS configuration module, 
network traffic capture module, IDS process core, IDS rule 
module, and IDS result module, as illustrated in Fig. 6. 
1) IDS Configuration Module: In this module, the SCADA-
IDS configuration file was generated for the proposed 
detection apporaches and rules, which includes automatic 
configuration information from the SCD file using the SCD 
parser, as well as pre-configuration information. The pre-
configuration information was obtained in two ways:  
a) Self-learning from the real-time or captured normal 
traffic. For example, according to the normal traffic, the 
authorized IP addresses, MAC addresses and port numbers 
were automatically learned by the IDS configuration module 
and added to the whitelists of access-control detection and 
SNTP model; based on captured MMS traffic from the station 
layer, the IDS configuration module has trained using 
9,107,644 packets for several traffic indices, such as the upper 
and lower threshold values of the packet transfer rate per 
second (PPS) and the length of packets. The minimum value 
and the maximum value of packet length are 60 and 300 bytes, 
respectively. The scope of PPS is [50, 400], and the real traffic 
of the IEC 61850 station network is demonstrated in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Real traffic of the IEC 61850 station level network. 
b) Professional knowledge on the protocol specifications 
and practical operational experience. The following are 
examples of the pre-configuration information. 
 The implicit configuration information can be obtained 
from the IEC 61850 protocol and technical specifications for 
project implementation, with which real smart substation 
projects comply, e.g. in the priority field model, the GOOSE 
packets have priority over SMV packets in the process bus of 
the real smart substation, and the priority values of GOOSE 
and SMV packets are 6 and 4, respectively; in the destination 
address model, the destination address fields of a GOOSE 
packet and a SMV packet are set as starting with four octets 
(01-0C-CD-01) and (01-0C-CD-04), respectively; in the 
APPID field model, the APPID fields of GOOSE packets and 
SMV packets are configured with ranges of [0000-3FFF] and 
[4000-7FFF], respectively; in correlation model, the APPID 
field should be the last two octets of the destination address 
field. 
 According to practical operational experience, critical 
control commands have time-related constraints. As an 
example of an interrogation command, a client in a control 
center might send a remote control command to request 
information from servers, and normally the time interval is 15 
minutes. 
 In normal operation of the smart substation, the SMV 
parameter channels of MUs and the associated MMS of 
multiple relay devices (A and B sets) were configured for the 
consistency detector. The deviation threshold of any two SMV 
parameters was set as 1% reference value. The threshold value 
of any differential current was set as 10% rating value, and 
deviation threshold of two differential current values was set 
as 5% rating value. 
The above pre-configuration information is provided as a 
set of examples, and in practice it can be extended with much 
more configuration-specific data that will not be published 
here due to the potentially sensitive nature of some of the data. 
2) Network Traffic Capture Module: In the module, the IEC 
61850 protocol parser was developed for real-time capturing 
and parsing of MMS/SNTP traffic from the station bus and 
GOOSE/SMV traffic from the process bus. The captured 
actual pcap files were also parsed by this module.  
3) IDS Process Core: The IDS process core is developed 
based on the internet traffic and content analysis (ITACA) tool 
[29], which is a software platform for traffic sniffing and real-
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time network analysis [2]. The SCADA-specific IDS is 
developed in C/C++ using the ITACA platform. 
4) IDS Rule Module: This module is the most critial 
component of the proposed IDS, and is developed to 
implement the ACD, PWP, MBD, and MPD disscussed in 
Section III. A database is set up for the SCADA-IDS which 
stores critical status parameters of the SCADA system in order 
to realize multiple packets (cross-packet) inspection. 
5) IDS Result Module: The detection results are 
demonstrated on the SCADA-IDS graphical user interface 
(GUI) in the substation control room and recorded in the 
































































Fig. 7.  Implementation of proposed IDS for smart substations. 
V. TEST-BED AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Cyber-Physical Test-Bed 
In order to investigate potential cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in IEC 61850 based smart substations and 
verify the proposed IDS, a cyber-physical test-bed has been 
built in the State Grid Key Laboratory of Substation Intelligent 
Equipment Testing Technology in China [23], as demonstrated 
in Fig. 8. In this test-bed, practical IEDs, switches and 
monitoring system were used to replicate the SCADA network 
of a typical 500kV smart substation. The developed Linux-
based IDS device was connected to the central station level 
switch and the process level switches using port mirroring. 
According to the experiments in this test-bed, an infected 
maintenance engineer’s laptop or removable USB drive could 
propagate malware and launch a cyberattack tailored for smart 
substations, as shown by the yellow triangle in Fig. 8. The aim 
is to mimic the kind of attack that affected electrical utility 
customers in Ukraine in 2015. 
B. Experimental results 
In order to verify the proposed IDS approaches in this 
paper, an “attacker” laptop was directly connected to the 
station bus and the process bus to launch a number of 
cyberattacks in this test-bed, such as malformed packet attack, 
DoS attack, address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing 
attack, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, as depicted in 
the authors’ previous work [23]. The attack could equally have 
originated from a malware infected host on the network. In this 
test-bed, total 32 types of attack scenarios were exemplified in 
the experiment.  
 
 
Fig. 8.  Cyber-physical test-bed of IEC 61850 based smart substation 
 
In addition, to prove the robustness of the proposed 
SCADA-IDS in a real environment, we conducted experiments 
using SCADA traffic captured from an actual operating 500kV 
substation based on IEC 61850. First, the normal SCADA 
traffic was collected as a dataset, which contains station bus 
traffic (2,001,928 packets), GOOSE traffic (1,757,910 
packets), and SMV traffic (21,660,000 packets). Second, the 
real packets were retrieved using Wireshark and the payload 
data were modified using a packet revision program. 318 types 
of abnormal packets were generated by modifying the captured 
data or by injecting new malicious packets into the precaptured 
PCAP file. In a real attack there are a number of ways this 
could be achieved, but the detectable outcome will be similar. 
Third, the captured traffic with abnormal packets was 
retransferred to the substation network. In this experiment, 32 
types of proposed detection rules were integrated into the IDS 
rule module in Fig. 7. The effectiveness of the implemented 
IDS was validated with all the malicious attacks detected in the 
given experiment. The experimental results were recorded in a 
log file, and the message format in the log file is defined 
referring to RFC 3164. The detailed message format [28] is as 
follows:  
<SEVERITY> TIMESTAMP DEVICE_NAME DEVICE_TYPE 
ALERT_TYPE EVENT_DESCRIPTION SRC_IP/SRC_MAC 
(SRC_PORT) DST_IP/DST_MAC (DST_PORT) 
In this case, SEVERITY represents alert severity which is 
described by a numerical code, e.g., 0, 1, 2 and 3 stand for 
EMERGENCY, ERROR, WARNING, and NOTICE, respectively. 
The TIMESTAMP field is the local time and is in the format of 
“YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.” DEVICE_NAME means the name 
of a specific security device. DEVICE_TYPE is the type of the 
security device, for example, IDS. ALERT_TYPE represents 
an alert event type which is violated such as ACD, PWD, MBD, or 
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MPD. EVENT_DESCRIPTION describes the detailed 
information of the specific security event. SRC_MAC, SRC_IP, 
SRC_PORT, DST_MAC, DST_IP, and DST_PORT are source 
MAC address, source IP address, source port, destination 
MAC address, destination IP address, and destination port, 
respectively. In terms of GOOSE/SMV detection results, only 
SRC_MAC and DST_MAC are required. 
The logged messages generated as an output from this 
experiment can be understood as follows. Fig. 9 shows an alert 
that the suspicious state number or sequence number of the 
GOOSE packet is detected when a GOOSE packet is sent from 
the intelligent terminal A of circuit breaker 5072 (IB5072A) to 
the line protection A (PL5071A). According to the 
experiments in the cyber-physical test-bed, the false state 
number or sequence number of GOOSE packets in the process 
bus may cause rejection of relay protection. In this specific 
example, the real GOOSE packets were retrieved using 
Wireshark and the payload data of actual GOOSE packets was 
modified using a packet revision program. The associated 
abnormal packet is illustrated in Fig. 10. The normal StNum 
(0x0530) of the payload in Packet 448323 has become the byte 
(0x0531). However, the value of SqNum was still 0x156172, 
rather than zero. In the alert resulting from correlation model 
detection, one of MBDs is violated (discussed in Section III-
C-2). 
 
<0> 2015-12-14 12:41:15 SCADA-61850-IDS IDS MBD-2-j 
suspicious state number or sequence number of the 
GOOSE packet **:**:00:00:10:3c **:**:cd:01:10:3c 
Fig. 9.  The MBD-2-j alert message in the log file 
 
Fig. 11 illustrates other part of the alert messages generated 
due to the proposed IDS violation (described in Section III). 
For example, ACD-1, MBD-1-a, MBD-2-a, MPD-1, and 
MPD-2 specifically refer to the access-control detector, report 
service model, destination address model, correlation model, 
remote signaling comparison detector, and consistency 
detector, respectively. The results show how this proposed 
approach can be effective against cyberattacks, since the 
physical effects are also detected, rather than the IT causes 
alone.  
The indirect and valid comparisons are made between the 
proposed IDS and the most relevant state-of-the-art proposals, 
as shown in Table I. The advantages of the proposed IDS are 





Fig. 10.  Abnormal GOOSE packet detected by MBD 
 
<0> 2015-12-14 18:58:23 SCADA-61850-IDS IDS ACD-1 
Unauthorized Connection Attempt to a non-IEC61850 
Port of a Server **.18.50.18 2218 **.18.50.215 66 
<0> 2015-12-14 19:14:58 SCADA-61850-IDPS IDS MBD-1-a 
Suspicious DoS attack: abnormal connection requests 
to occupy the instantiable report control blocks of 
the IED **.18.50.201 64154 **.18.50.64 102  
<1> 2015-12-14 19:30:29 SCADA-61850-IDS IDS MBD-2-a 
suspicious destination address of the SMV packet 
**:**:cd:66:40:26 **:**:00:00:40:26 
<1> 2015-12-14 20:15:45 SCADA-61850-IDS IDS MPD-1 
Abnormal switch-in signal **.18.50.16 102 **.18.50.3 
42018  
<2> 2015-12-14 20:25:23 SCADA-61850-IDS IDS MPD-2 
Abnormal differential current of protection relay 
**.18.50.18 102 **.18.50.5 45302  
 






TABLE I  
SCADA-Specific IDS Comparisons 








[9] Power plants   Modbus TCP Critical state analysis C# < 1 ms 99% 
[12] IEC 61850 substations 
ARP/ICMP/HTTP/ 
FTP/Telnet 































Compared with physical security for conventional substations, 
and cybersecurity for IT networks, research on intrusion 
detection for IEC 61850 based substations is lacking. In 
particular, published literature lacks validation of solutions 
using data from real electrical substations. Furthermore, and as 
a result, many published approaches do not focus on providing 
solutions that are truly tailored to practical implementation at 
the physical application layer. This research has proposed and 
developed a multi-layered IDS that focuses on the specific 
physical environment and application data of the substation to 
be protected. Key to this is the novel use of configuration 
information from the SCD file in order to automatically 
configure the deployed IDS to the substation where the IDS is 
installed. The proposed solution also adopts detection 
appraches based around expert knowledge such as GOOSE 
and SMV parameter configuration data.This provides a clear 
advantage over exisitng proposals that are more generic in 
nature and do not take account of the practical operational 
environemt. The proposed IDS has been implemented and 
validated in a realistic substation environment. The proposed 
IDS offers a significant advancement in protecting modern 
substations against the growing threat of targeted cyberattacks 
against electrical infrastructure. The IDS has been deployed in 
a real 500kV smart substation as a trial application. Future 
work will focus on gathering useful operation data and 
obtaining practical experience, for further refinement of the 
system. 
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